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WHAT CONGRESS'S REPEAL
EFFORTS CAN TEACH US
ABOUT REGULATORY REFORM
CARY COGLIANESE* & GABRIEL SCHEFFLER**

ABSTRACT

Major legislative actions during the early part of the I I 5th Congress have undermined
the central argumentfor regulator reform measures such as the RELVS Act, a bill that
would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the
RELVS Act argue that it would make the federal regulator system more democratic by
shifting responsibilityfor regulatoy decisions away from unelected bureaucratsand toward
the people's representativesin Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of
the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress's most s 'gni/cant initiatives during this period-its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care
Act and its successful efforts to repealfifteen regulations under the CongressionalReview
Act exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation. These repeal efforts reveal how
the REINS Act would counterintuitive@y undermine ky democratic elements of the current
regulatoy process by renderingit less tran sparent and deliberative.
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INTRODUCTION
'

'2

"Insane." "Secret."
"Not a responsible way to legislate." '3 These are
just some of the ways that Republicans in Congress have described their
own party's efforts in 2017 to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Not
only did Republicans ultimately stumble in repealing and replacing the Act,
but the legislative process they followed undermined, however unintentionally, the rationale for another one of their legislative priorities: regulatory
reform.
One of the most prominent regulatory reform bills advanced by Republicans the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS)
Act-would dramatically increase congressional involvement in the rulemaking process by requiring Congress to approve all major agency rules
before they could become law. 4 Proponents of this bill argue that it would
make the federal regulatory system more transparent and democratic by
shifting responsibility from unelected bureaucrats and requiring direct deliberation by the people's representatives in Congress.u
But in key respects, the process used by agencies to create regulations is
generally more democratic than how Congress tends to operate. 6 Con-

1. Benjamin Hart, The Best GOP Reactions to the Death of Trumpcare, DAL
INTLLLJGLNCLR July 18, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/the-bestgop-reactions-to-the-death-of-trumpcare.html.
2. Paulina Firozi, Rand Paul Basts GOPfir Keeping ObamaCare Bill in 'Secure Location,' THL
HILL (Mar.2, 2017), http: //thehill.com/policy/ healthcare/ 321990-paul-blasts-house-gopfor-keeping-obamacare-bill-in-secure-location.
3. Joe Lawlor, Sen. Susan Collins Criticizes Secretive Process of Senate Health Care Replacement
Bill, PORTLAND PRLSS HLRALD June 16, 2017), http://-ww,,w.pressherald.com/2017/
06/16/susan-cohins-criticizes-secremive-process-of-senate-health-care-replacement-bil/.
4. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th
Cong. § 3 (2017).
5. See, e.g., Senators Reintroduce RELYS Act, U.S. SEN. RAND PAUL OF Kx. Jan. 5, 2017),
https://wxN,, ,.paul.senate.gov/news/senators-reintroduce-reins-act
(describing regulatory
agencies as "wreaking havoc" on the nation and arguing that the REINS Act would ensure
proper "accountability, oNversight, and transparency"); Jonathan H. Adler, Placing "RELYS"
on Regulations:Assessing the Proposed RELVSAct, 16 N.Y.U.J. LLGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 36 (2013)
(arguing that "[t]he REINS Act forces major regulatory decisions onto the floor of Congress,
and into the open, which provides greater transparency than backroom dealmaking or the
administrative rulemaking process" and which "proNides a means of enhancing political accountability for regulatory policy").
6. To be sure, agencies might seem at first glance to be less democratic simply because
they are headed by unelected officials. But that narrow niew fails to account for the fact that
agencies are, in important ways, tied closely to the electorate through the President, not to
mention through ongoing congressional oNversight. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdmin
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gress's own actions in particular, its attempts to repeal and replace the
ACA, as well as the way in which it repealed fifteen regulations under the
Congressional Review Act in 2017 show that efforts to shift regulatory
decisionmaking into the legislative process would in reality weaken democratic deliberation and result in less thoughtful regulatory decisions. If the
nation wants its regulatory system to reflect robust public deliberation, then
passing legislation that would further entangle regulatory decisionmaking in
legislative politics is likely to prove counterproductive.
I. CONGRESS, AGENCIES, AND DEMOCRACY
In a nation dedicated to democratic principles, it may seem surprising
that most federal law in the United States today consists of rules or regulations issued by administrative agencies, rather than statutes written by
Congress. Each year, agencies such as the Department of Transportation
and the Securities and Exchange Commission collectively issue thousands
of regulations, 7 compared to roughly a hundred or fewer substantive stat8
utes passed by Congress.
Although the administrators who head federal bureaucracies never stand
for election, they are, of course, still accountable to elected officials in multiple ways. Appointed by the President, most administrators continue to
serve only at the President's pleasure and under the oversight of the White
House. Moreover, the Senate must confirm the heads of agencies before
they can take office. Congress must also expressly delegate to agencies the
legal authority to create rules. When agencies issue rules, they must follow
well-specified procedures that, among other things, require that the public
receive notice and have an opportunity to comment on proposed rules before they can be made final. 9 Agencies must stay within the bounds of these
statutory guidelines or else the courts will strike down their regulations.

istration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332 (2001) ("[P]residendal leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter's responsiveness to
the former."). Moreov7er, electoral accountability is only one facet of democratic governance; another is the quality of democratic deliberation in policy decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
Jon Elster, The Mlarket and the Forum: Three Vaheties of Political Theog, in FOUNDAI0NS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103 32 Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1989) (discussing deliberation as one core conception of democracy).
7.
IAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULAiIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF RULMAKJNG,

TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS,

AND PAGES IN THE

(2016).
8. Drew DeSilver, Congress' Productivzi Improves Somewhat in 2015, PLX\ RES. CTR.:
FACTANK (Dec. 29, 2015), http://ww\w\,.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/29/congressFLDLRALRLGISTLR 1

product Nty-improv7es-somewhat-in-2015/.

9.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (c)(2012).
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Congress gives agencies the authority to issue legally binding rules because, among other reasons, legislators have neither the time nor the expertise to make all the highly technical policy judgments needed to enact sensible, effective regulations. Congress can call for greater safety in consumer
products or reductions in water pollution, but figuring out exactly how to
achieve these goals demands an in-depth understanding of regulated industries and an ability to establish more fine-grained policies. 10 Administrative
agencies staffed as they are with career professionals, many with backgrounds in science and economics constitute what Cass Sunstein has
called the "most knowledgeable branch" of government." The officials in
these agencies can take the time and devote the resources needed to gather
public input and craft rules designed to implement the goals contained in
statutes.
Although it makes sense for Congress to give regulatory authority to
agencies, when Congress does so, it effectively gives up some degree of control over public policy decisions and their implementation. Congress still
maintains control over agency budgets and continues to oversee what agencies do, and it always retains the ability to enact new laws that revise agencies' authority, but the officials who run administrative agencies nevertheless possess considerable lawful discretion in deciding how to design
regulatory standards. That agency discretion, in turn, enables the federal
government to be more responsive to public concerns. 12
In an effort to retain more meaningful control over regulations, Congress
used to insert legislative veto clauses into regulatory statutes, providing that
agency regulations could be rejected by a majority vote of sometimes just a
single chamber of Congress. But in 1983, the Supreme Court declared
such legislative veto provisions unconstitutional in Jmm'gration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha.13 The Court said that if Congress wishes to override
agency decisions, then both chambers of Congress must pass legislation
voiding or changing an agency decision or regulation and that legislation
either must win the president's signature or be passed with sufficient majorities to override a presidential veto. 14 In short, if Congress does not like a
regulation that an agency creates, then it must follow the process outlined

10. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truthfor Power. In
fnmmational Strategy and Regulatoy Poliy laking, 89 MNN. L. RLv. 277 (2004).
11. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. RLV. 1607, 1607
(2016).
12. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: 47]y Administ alms Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (arguing for giving "authority to administrators as a device for
improving the responsiveness gov7ernment to the desires of the electorate").
13.
14.

462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
Jd. at 956 57.
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in the Constitution for adopting legislation. 15
As a practical matter, this means that Congress needs veto-proof majorities to pass legislation overriding an agency regulation, since presidents can
be expected to veto legislation rejecting the regulations created by agencies
within their own administrations. After all, the heads of agencies are the
President's appointees and, for most agencies, significant rules only go forward if they receive the blessing of the White House. 6
Congress responded to the Court's ruling in Chadha over a decade later
by enacting the Congressional Review Act (CRA).17 The CRA does not
obviate the constitutional requirements for passing legislation, but it establishes a fast-track process that enables Congress to repeal recent agency
regulations by following special internal procedures, which most notably
limit filibusters in the Senate. 18 After an agency notifies Congress of a new
regulation it has adopted, if Congress wishes to avail itself of the CRA's
procedures, then it has sixty session days to pass a resolution disapproving
the regulation. 19 If the resolution passes both houses and is signed by the
president, then the disapproved regulation is formally repealed.20 Furthermore, if a regulation is repealed under the CRA, then the agency is barred
from adopting any other regulation in the future that is "substantially the
same," unless Congress adopts new legislation that specifically gives the
21
agency permission to do so.
Of course, presidents can always veto disapproval resolutions, which, as
noted, they presumably would do for any regulations emanating from their
own administrations. For this reason, the CRA as a practical matter has
generally come into play only shortly following presidential transitions,
since it offers the new president a short window to overturn regulations that
22
were issued toward the end of the previous administration.

§ 7,

15.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

16.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).

17.

5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).

18.
19.

Id. § 802(a, (d).
Id. § 802.

20.
21.

Id. § 801(b)(1).
See Adam M. Finkel &Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost Benefit

LvSimilar" Hurdle

cl. 2, 3.

7ntejnretation
ofthe "Substantial

in the Congressional Review Act Can OSHA Ever tte the E l1ord (Egonomics)

Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. RLV. 707, 710 (2011). What constitutes a rule that is "substantially the

same" has yet to be decided in the courts, but the issue may well be litigated in the coming
years. See Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the Congressional Review Act:
the Courts Should Assert
Judicial Review, ,Varrowl Construe 'Substantial/p the Same,' and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under

u47h

Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. RLV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=3009317.
22.

MALVL

P.

CARLY,

ALISSA M.

DoLAN,

& CHRISTOPHLR

M.

DAVIS,

CONG.

RLSLARCH SLRV., R43992, THL CONGRLSSIONAL RLIL\\ ACT: FRLQULNTLY ASKLD
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In recent years, Republican members of Congress have been trying to
pass additional bills that would give Congress more practical influence over
agency regulations. For example, the House of Representatives has passed
a bill that would expand the scope of the CRA by allowing Congress to repeal multiple regulations at once by voting on a single resolution of disapproval, rather than just proceeding one regulation at a time as provided in
the CRA.23
The REINS Act would go still further. Instead of Congress just having
the power to disapprove of regulations after agencies have already issued
them, the REINS Act would require that Congress take affirmative action
to approve new regulations before they could take effect.2 4 The bill's requirement for legislative approval would apply only to "major rules," which
generally are those with economic effects above $100 million annually.2
For such regulations, the REINS Act would turn an otherwise final agency
rule into merely a legislative proposal, subject to an up-or-down vote. The
House passed the REINS Act in January 2017,26 and President Donald
Trump has reportedly said that he will sign it if it reaches his desk.27
II.

STARK LESSONS FROM "REPEAL AND REPLACE"

The REINS Act is ostensibly designed to make regulations more democratic by increasing Congress's role in the regulatory process. Yet the way
that Congress has handled its legislative affairs undermines the case for legislation requiring greater congressional involvement in the regulatory process. In particular, the means by which Republicans sought to repeal and
replace the ACA in 2017 illustrate all too well how increased legislative involvement would serve to weaken democratic deliberation over government
regulation.
Members of Congress from both parties, as well as longtime observers of
congressional politics, have expressed shock at how congressional leaders
conducted the process to try to repeal and replace the ACA.28 House Re-

QUESTIONS, CRS REPORT (Nov. 17, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf.

23. Midnight Rules ReliefAct of 2017, H.R. 21, 115th Cong. § 2(b) (2017 2018).
24. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th
Cong. § 3 (2017).
25.
26.
27.

Id.
H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (2017).
Phil Kerpen, It's Time to Rein in Regulators, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2016),
https: //ww v.usaModay.com/ story/ opinion/ 2016 /12 /30 /s-time-rein-regulators/ 96001658.
28. Julie Rov ner (@jrovner), TNrTER (July 24, 2017, 4:56 PM), https://twitter.com/
jrovner/status/889635369418973188?refsrc=email&s= 11 ; Jackie Calmes (@jackiekcalmes),
TwrILTER
July 25,
2017,
7:53 AM), https://twitter.com/jackiekcalmes/status/
889861274129059840?wpisrc=nlwonk&wqpmm= 1.
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publicans narrowly passed a repeal-and-replace bill in May 2017 that had
only been released the night before the vote.2 9 House leaders thus not only
short-circuited any opportunity for public deliberation, but they did not
even wait for members to read and digest the legislation or to benefit from
the scoring of the legislation typically provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).30 As Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) commented at the
time, "any bill that has been posted less than 24 hours going to be debat3
ed three or four hours, not scored needs to be viewed with suspicion."1 1
When attention turned to the Senate during the summer months, the
process was no more transparent or deliberative. Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell (R-KY) crafted the Senate's version of the legislation in complete secrecy, prompting Senator Ron Johnson (R-WVI) to complain that
Senate leaders were trying to "jam this thing through" before the Fourth of
July recess. 32 Johnson emphasized the need for more information about the
33
bill, lamenting that informed debate "seems to be foreign to this place.1
Despite such complaints, when McConnell tried to move the legislation
forward after the July holiday recess, the process proved no more informed
than before. Republicans approved a motion to proceed with debate on a
bill before they had even settled upon a bill. 4 In a widely-lauded speech on

29.

Rachel Sachs, IThy Process latters: Health Care Reform Edition, TAKE CARL BLOG (June

9, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-process-matters-health-care-reform-edition.
30. Sarah Kliff, Congress is Voting Thursday on a Bill to Replace Obamacare; The CBO Still
Hasn't Scored It, VOX (May 3, 2017), https://-xvw .ox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/
5/3/15536680/vNoxcare-ahca-vote-cbo-score-absurd.
31. Matt Flegenheimer, The Vext Step for the Republican Health Care Bill: A Skeptical Senate,
N.Y. TJMES (May 4, 2017), https://w-w'A,.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/politics/senatehealth-care-bill.html. Of course, a few months later, Senator Graham would find himself
putting forth a hastily drafted bill as part of a failed, last-ditch effort to undo the Affordable
Care Act.
32. Jack O'Brien, Ron Johnson on Senate Healthcare Bill: Leadership II ants 'to Jam this Thing
Through', WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 25, 2017), http://-xx\,\,\.washingtonexaminer.com
/ron-johnson-on-senate-healthcare-bil-leadership-wants-to-j am-this-thing-through/ article/
2627088.
33. lore Time, Infonmation Needed on Bill: GOP Senator, MORNJ-NGJOE (MSNBC television
broadcast June 28, 2017), http://-x\ \,\.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/more-timeinformadon-needed-on-bill-gop-senator-977889859851.
34. Sean Sullivan, Kelsey Snell, Ed O'Keefe &John Wagner, McCain's Return to Senate
Injects llomentum into GOP Health Care Battle, WASH. POST (July 24, 2017), https://
w\'\w.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trumps-tough-talk-on-health-care-aims-to-re
iN\e-flag
ging-senate-effort/2017/07/24/a8acdb3e-7091-11e7-9eac-d56bd5568db8_story.html
(noting widespread "confusion Monday about exacly which direction senators would go on
Tuesday when and if the voting starts" and reporting Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) as asking
about the motion to proceed, "What are we proceeding to?").
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the Senate floor, SenatorJohn McCain (R-AZ) decried McConnell's strategy of "coming up with a proposal behind closed doors" and "then springing
it on skeptical members" although he, too, supported the initial motion to
proceed.3
McConnell's gambit ultimately failed with Senators Susan Collins (RME), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and, most dramatically, McCain casting the
decisive votes to kill the legislation. Down to the very end, the tactics were
the same. The underlying "skinny repeal" bill which the CBO estimated
would have left sixteen million people uninsured and raised premiums in
the exchanges by twenty percent was released only a few hours before the
decisive vote.36
Senator Graham called the bill a "disaster" and a
"fraud.' 7 He and two other Republican Senators said they would vote for
38
it only if they received assurances that it would never become law.
When Senator Graham and Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) revived the
health care repeal effort in September, Senate Republicans once again tried
to rush the bill to a vote as quickly as possible. This time, they released the
final version of the Graham-Cassidy bill only a few days before the Senate
was scheduled to vote on it. They held just a single legislative hearing
one at which the majority called other senators to be the principal witnesses
and at which only five members of the public were reportedly allowed to
attend after protests occurred in the hearing room.39 Senate leaders also
did not intend to wait for a complete CBO score, and they planned to allow
only ninety seconds of floor debate. 40 Yet this effort too failed, as three Re-

35.

McCain's Speech on the Senate Floor, CNN (July 25, 2017), http://www
1,,.cnn.com/

2017 /07 /25 /politics/john-mccain-speech-full-text-senate /index.html,
36.
CONG. BUDGET 0FFICL, EsTnIxil OF DIRCT SPENDING AND RLVLNUL EFFECTS
OF H.R. 1628,THE HEALIHCARL FRLLDOMi ACTOF 2017, AN AMENDMENT IN IHL NATURL
OF A SUBSTITUTL (S.A. 667) (2017), https: //ww\i\.cbo.gov/ system/ files/ 115th-congress-

2017-2018/costestimate/s.a.667.pdf.
37. Graham: 'Skinny' GOP Health- Care Bill is a 'Disaster,' 'Fraud,' WASH. POST (July 27,
2017),
https://N,\,,\vw\.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/graham-skinny-gop-health-carebil-is-a-disaster-fraud/2017/07/27/c263b2dc-7311-1 le7-8c 17-533c52b2ff) 14_video.html.
38. These Senators demanded assurances from the House Speaker that he would not
approve the exact same bill, so that they would have an opportunity to make further
amendments in a conference committee.

Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Rejects

Slimmed Down Obamacare Repeal as McCain

Votes ,Vo,

N.Y. TIMLS

July 27,

2017),

https: //wwwiv.nytimes.com /2017 /07 /27 /us /politics /obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-repub
licans-revolt.html.
39. Dana Milbank, Cassidy is 'Sor" About the Cassidy Graham Process. He Should Be., WASH.
PosT (Sept. 25, 2017), https://ww\,\,.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cassidy-is-sorry-aboutthe-cassidy-graham-process-he-should-be/2017/09/25/Ocd234ff)-a243-1 le7-adel-76d061d
56efa-story.html.
40. Bob Bryan, The Latest Republican Obamacare Repeal is Being Pushed through the Senate at
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publicans vowed to vote against the bill, denying Republicans the majority
they needed to act under a special budget reconciliation process that is ex41
empt from the Senate filibuster.
Whatever the future of the ACA may be, the Republicans' repeal-andreplace saga is emblematic of a larger shift away from legislative procedures
designed to ensure that Congress engages in robust deliberation. 42 Even
though the process used to attempt to repeal the ACA might seem like an
extreme example, the reality is that for years now, in the face of growing
political polarization, most controversial legislation under both Democratic
and Republican leadership of Congress has often moved forward in what
political scientist Barbara Sinclair has aptly, if perhaps charitably, described
as an "unorthodox" manner driven by party leaders and often bypassing
or dismissing the work of committees. 43 The REINS Act, if enacted, would
44
only risk infusing such unorthodoxy into major regulatory decisions.
III. FURTHER LESSONS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
Other legislative actions during the opening of the 1 15th Congress have
presented a similarly revealing, if also disconcerting, picture of what greater
congressional involvement in the regulatory process would look like. During the first ten months of 2017, Congress used the CRA to repeal fifteen

Lightning Speed, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2017), http://-\w\w.businessinsider.com/grahamcassid)-health-care-obamacare-repeal-vote-dmeline-2017-9; Elise Viebeck, Seven Tays the
Latest Republican Health Care Effort is Impulsive and Chaotic, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://wwx\.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/sev7en-ways-the-latest-republican-health-careeffort-is-impulsive-and-chaotic/2017/09/24/4451 aaf4-9fa 1-1 le7-8eal-ed975285475e stor
y.html.
41. Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They 1il ot Vote on Health
Bill, N.Y. TMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://-wxv'.,.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/
mcconnell-obamacare-repeal-graham-cassidy-trump.html.
42. Republicans pursued a similar legislative strateg y with the tax oNverhaul they passed
at the end of 2017. See, e.g., John Cassidy, The Republican Tax Strategy: Speed, Subteruge, and Di
version,

NEW

YORKER

(NoN. 17,

2017),

https://wx-.\\.ne\orker.com/news/our-

columnists /the-republican-tax-strategy-speed-subterfuge-and-diversion;
Car) Coglianese,
Tax Reform Saga Should Alarm Defendern of Democratic Process, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2017),
http://thehil.com/opinion/finance/365556-tax-reform-saga-should-alarm-defenders-of-de
mocratic-process.
43. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAW MAKING NLW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2011).
44. Some leading scholars have argued that the rulemaking process has seen itsown
recent introduction of unorthodox practices. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell &
Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUMa. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
ENven if this is the case, the REINS Act would still
amount to a radical change in the rulemaking process.
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regulations that were designed to deliver public protections on issues such
45
as Internet privacy, gun safety, water quality, and fair business practices.
Senate Majority Leader McConnell hailed the repeals of these rules as the
most significant legislative achievements of the 115th Congress's first six
months, 46 but a look at how Congress went about repealing these rules only
reinforces the conclusion that the first branch of government suffers from a
deliberative deficit.
Consider who participated in the development and subsequent repeal of the now-defunct rules. Based on the agency dockets for each of
the fifteen regulations, staff at the agencies that issued these rules reviewed
a total of over 420,000 public comments. 4' These comments came from a
diverse collection of individual members of the public as well as from businesses, public interest groups, and state and local officials. By contrast, the
process Congress used in repealing these rules appears to have been driven
largely by just one segment of society: industry. The New York Times reported that industry lobbyists began working with Republican staff members on
Capitol Hill "within days of the election" to decide which regulations to
48
target for repeal.
Not only do agencies entertain a full array of public comments, they also
must take the time to respond to these comments in writing as they prepare
their analyses of their proposed rules. 49 Most significant rules must be separately reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in the White House. -)O Such painstaking analysis and deliberation
can take time nearly two and a half years on average for the fifteen recently repealed rules. The final versions of these same regulations together
contained over 1,700 pages of justification and analysis, all made available
to the public.
Unlike agencies, Congress is not required to respond to public comments
45.

RULLS AT RISK (Dec.25, 2017), http://rulesatrisk.org/.
46. Ryan Grim, M itch
McConnell Has Run Out of Excuses for Vot Accomplishing Anything,
INTLRCLPT July 18, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/07/18/mitch-mcconnell-has-

run-out-of-excuses-for-not-accomplishing-anything/.
47. All calculations and data referred to in this
section are available upon request.
48. Eric Lipton, G.O.P. Hurries to Slash Oil and Gas Rules, Ending Industries' 8 Year Tait,
N.Y. TENILS (Feb. 4, 2017), hups:/ /ww',, nytimes.com/ 2017 /02 /04/ us /politics/ republicans
-oil-gas-regulations.html.
49. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 & 706 (2012) (requiring agencies
to publish a statement of a rule's "basis and purpose" and to avoid acting in an "arbitrary"
manner); see genera/ Lisa Schultz Bressman & Glen Staszewski, JudicialReview ofAgency Discre
tion, in A GUJDL TO JUDICIAL AND POLIICAL RLLW OF FLDLRAL AGLNCLS 226 (Michael
E. Herz, Richard Murphy, & Kathryn Watts, eds., 2017) ("Courts have long held that an
agency must respond to 'relevant' and 'significant' comments.").
50. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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or to explain its decisions. Congress managed to repeal all fifteen rules
combined in fewer than 2,000 words what amounts to roughly six doublespaced pages of text in total. - Furthermore, by repealing these regulations
under the CRA, Congress by extension banned agencies from adopting any
substantially similar regulations in the future all without explaining to the
public how repealing these rules will affect their welfare. )2
In contrast to the years that agencies spent evaluating comments and analyzing their regulations, it took Congress a mere four months on average
including congressional recesses for both chambers to vote to repeal the
fifteen regulations, mostly on party-line votes. 5 Even if Congress wanted to
take a more deliberate approach, the CRA's fast-track procedures explicitly
4
limit the time for floor debate on resolutions of disapproval.
Congress can no longer use this law's special procedures to repeal regulations adopted by the Obama Administration due to the CRA's limitation
on disapprovals after sixty session days following notice of a rulemaking. 5- 5
But this has not kept members of Congress from using the CRA to target
additional regulatory actions adopted since January by independent agencies which are exempt from OIRA review and thus more insulated from
White House influence. In October 2017, Congress passed a resolution of
disapproval overturning a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulation adopted in July 2017 that would have blocked credit card companies
and banks from inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into their contracts
that keep consumers from taking legal action over complaints of institutional abuses. -56 President Trump signed this resolution into law at a private
signing ceremony reportedly attended by the heads of various bank lobby57

ing groups.

Until this year, the only previous occasion when Congress used the CRA
to strike down a regulation occurred in 2001, when Congress repealed a
major Occupational Safety and Health Administration workplace safety
rule adopted at the end of the Clinton Administration. At the time, Peg
51.

We reviewed all of the CRA resolutions to calculate their length.

52.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. For each resolution of disapproval, we calculated the amount of time elapsed from
when the underlying agency rule was submitted to Congress to when the resolution of disapproval was passed by both chambers.
54.
55.
56.

See supra notes 17 18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
David Sherfinski, House Votes to undo Federal Consumer Bureau's Arbitration Rule, W\ASH.
news/ 2017 /jul/ 25 /house-otesTIES (July 25, 2017), http: /w/\\w.washingtontimes.com/
to-undo-consumer-financial-protection-/.
57. Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule,

ins Banker Praise, THL HILL

(NON. 1, 2017), http://ww\w\,.thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-consumerbureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking.
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Seminario, the Director for Health and Safety for the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, complained to the New
York Times about what she called the "stunning" process Congress followed:
"This rule is ten years in the making, with ten weeks of public hearings on
it, and now they want to wipe it out with not even one hearing and less
than ten hours of debate. That's about as undemocratic a process as you
'' 8
can get.
CONCLUSION
The REINS Act would go much farther than the CRA because it would
require legislative approval of all major rules before they could take legal
effect. It would also curtail democratic deliberation by Congress even more
sharply than the CRA. Under the REINS Act, debate over a regulation in
the House would be limited to one hour total, while the "world's greatest
deliberative body" - the Senate would be afforded a whopping two
hours.60 With major public health and welfare consequences potentially
hanging in the balance, such tight constraints on legislative debate are at
odds with the REINS Act's ostensible goal of advancing sound, democratic
decisionmaking.
Of course, time limits on debate can be viewed as understandable from
another perspective: Congress already has a lot on its plate. Agencies typically produce close to 100 regulations each year that would be deemed
"major" under the REINS Act and which would demand formal approval
by Congress.
Moreover, members of Congress are generalists. 6 1 That is one of the
main reasons for Congress delegating regulatory responsibility to agency
officials in the first place, as agencies have the time, resources, and expertise
needed to analyze policy issues with care.6 2 It is precisely because Congress
does not have the time and resources to attend to the finer details of regulation that it has passed laws which delegate rulemaking responsibility to

58. Lizette Aharez & Steven Greenhouse, Senate G.O.P Moving to .,Vull[5 Clinton Rules on
lorker Injuries, N.Y. TIMLS (Mar. 3, 2001), http://-ww,,w.nydmes.com/2001/03/03/us/sen
ate-gop-mov7ing-to-nullify-clinton-rules-on-worker-injuries.html.
59. Paul Kane, On the Death of the Senate and its Long Histoy as the 17orld's
GreatestDeliberative
Body, WASH. POST Jan. 31, 2017), https://w-w\i, .washingtonpost.com/powerpost/on-thedeath-of-the-senate-and-its-long-histry-as-the-worlds-greatest-deliberati\e-body/2017/01
31 /b99fcbda-e73a- 1 le6-bfljf-30 lb6b443624_story.html.
60.
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th
Cong. §§ 802(d)(2), 802(e) (2017).
61. Ronald M. Levin, The RELS Act: Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GLO. WASH.
L. RLv.1446, 1455 (2015).
62.

Id.
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agencies, such as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,63 the National
6 Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,6 4 and the Clean Water Act.
In fulfilling their statutory duties, agencies typically invest years of study
and public engagement when developing major regulations and preparing
the necessary underlying analyses of how the public will be affected by the
new rules. 6 6 Under the REINS Act, the outcome of those extensive agency
deliberations would ultimately hinge on a legislative process culminating in
6
a mere three hours of floor debate. '
If the REINS Act were law, failure of both chambers to approve a regulation within seventy session days would mean that the regulation could not
take effect, and no new approval resolution could be considered until after
the next congressional election.68 In emergencies, the president would be
authorized to override the Act temporarily and allow the regulation to take
effect but only for ninety calendar days, after which the regulation would
69
cease to have any legal impact again.
If the Senate were to pass the REINS Act and President Trump were to
sign it, then agencies' regulatory decisionmaking in the future could well
become infected with some of the same dysfunctionalities that both Democrats and Republicans find afflict today's congressional process. Right now,
administrative law calls upon agencies to make decisions based on public
input and analysis of how best to fulfill their statutory responsibilities and
advance overall public value. 70 By adding a legal requirement for congressional approval before regulations can take effect, the REINS Act would
effectively encourage agencies to base their decisions over highly complex
and consequential regulations not on deliberations focused on the expected
impacts on all segments of society, but instead on consideration of political
stratagems in Congress, be it controlled by Republicans or Democrats.
One thing is clear: Republican legislators have, through their actions in
Congress over the first part of 2017, ironically made a case against one of
the very regulatory reforms they favor. Through their handling of the most
63.
64.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 399 (2012).
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101 30183 (2012).
65. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 1387 (2012).
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GOVRNMLNT AGENCILS WRIIL LAW AND MAKE POLICY 105 07 (4th ed. 2011) (summarizing research on EPA rules that showed "the average time that elapsed in rulemaking ... ranged from slightly more than two years to just under five years.").
67.
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th
Cong. §§ 802(d)(2), 802(e) (2017).
68.
69.
70.

Levin, supra note 61, at 1452.
Id. at 1453.
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salient legislative debate in the opening months of the new Congress
health care and arguably their most significant early domestic policy accomplishment the CRA repeals they have unwittingly undercut the case
for the REINS Act. Rather than inspire confidence that increased congressional involvement in regulation would enhance democratic values, the Republicans' repeal efforts have only underscored the rationale underlying
earlier Congresses' decisions to vest administrative agencies with the primary responsibility for making important regulatory determinations.

